The Rise of Virtual Politics in Moldova

The staged and unsubstantial change of government in Moldova one year before the parliamentary elections aims at repairing the trust of the West in the ruling Communist Party

The recent resignation of the Communist Party-appointed Moldovan prime-minister Vasile Tarlev has caught many outsiders by surprise. It has triggered the collapse of the whole government, just one year ahead of the 2009 parliamentary elections. The almost immediate, next day nomination by the president Vladimir Voronin of the second person from the ex-cabinet, the first deputy prime-minister Zinaida Grecianii, as a candidate for the head of government chair, has only added to the puzzle.

Such a dramatic political move has spurred speculations that this might be a scenario similar to the Fradkov government resignation last year in Russia. The self-demission of the Moldovan prime-minister was portrayed as the key resembling feature. The logic that followed this assumption concluded that what we are witnessing in Moldova is an element of a larger scheme aiming at selecting a successor to president Voronin from among the people loyal to his Communist Party (PCRM).

In search for a successor?

Indeed, the similarities between the two cases in Russia and Moldova are striking. Both prime-ministers presented their resignation as their own initiatives, doing it before the parliamentary elections in their countries, and invoking rather alike looking reasons. While the necessity to offer president Putin room for maneuvering, including in the area of personnel policy, was claimed in Russia, Vasile Tarlev has alleged his departure would allow Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin bringing in a new team “to work for the well being of the country”.

Mirroring the response of president Putin to his prime-minister’s stepping down, president Voronin has lauded the leaving government for their significant success in raising pensions and social welfare for the country’s most in need. Although probably a coincidence, both candidates nominated very speedily to the post of the prime minister, Victor Zubkov in Russia and Zinaida Greceanii in Moldova, have a financial background. It really looked like both presidents have read from the same script.

Regardless how tempting would be to draw the parallel lines in these two cases, the differences between them are even bigger than the similarities. Russian government does not depend on Western aid, and can promote independent policies, while Moldovan leadership somehow has its hands tied in its relations with the West. There are claims that Western aid helps Communist Party in Moldova to keep its social programs running, which adds to their domestic popularity. That means Russia’s political leadership is more vulnerable to internal challenges, when Moldovan leadership is more susceptible to pressures from outside and quite secure domestically at the moment.

President Putin reportedly needed the move with his successor for the continuation of his policies, even though his critics alleged it was done to protect him from possible domestic persecution after he leaves the office. In Moldova president Voronin is not going to face any serious challenges on internal politics arena at least for the next five years. Polls show that even though his Communist Party has dropped in popularity lately, it is still enjoying the highest support in the country.

Communism, the Moldovan way

Vladimir Voronin is very much aware of this fact. During an interview with the Russain news agency RIA Novosti in May last year, he has insisted that even after he leaves the President’s office, being the leader of the Communist Party will still make him the most influential person in Moldovan politics. Comparing himself with the Chinese communist leader Deng Xiaoping, president Voronin probably intended to assure the Russian audience and government that he will continue to de facto rule Moldova not necessarily holding an office, with his party keeping a majority of seats in the country’s Parliament.

His words proved to be prophetic so far. Just two days before the resignation of the government, the sixth Congress of the Communists’ Party of the Republic of Moldova has unanimously reconfirmed him as the chairman of the party. The eight hours-long life broadcasting of the congress on the web-page of the party has allowed watching how Chairman Voronin’s re-election took place. He had no competitor, and nobody dared to challenge anything that was declared by Voronin and his close party associates from the rostrum.

When a senior communist fellow asked the gathering who would like to vote for Vladimir Voronin staying the leader of the Communist Party, the proposal got unanimous support, and ironic smiles flashed briefly on the faces of congress delegates. It was all a parody of the Soviet times – the infamous hammer and sickle, the rhetoric question, unanimous voting, solemn applauses, and beforehand prepared flowers, handed ceremoniously to the newly confirmed Chairman of the Moldovan Communist Party.

With all procedures dutifully followed, the congress went correctly by the book, but it violated the spirit of democratic principles. During seven years of Communist ruling in Moldova this cynical formalism has spread into all governmental agencies, making it a consolidated trend of Moldovan institutional culture. And the authoritarian leadership methods that dominate the party were transferred into the Moldovan domestic politics. Although this was not the only lesson that communists’ congress has provided.

The Communist Party Program Paper that was approved at the congress bluntly stated that Moldovan communists perceive any military alliances as “an anachronism that contradicts the values of modern civilization, a tool for suppressing the freedom, and not aimed at the consolidation of democracy and security”. How reasonable is then to believe that a party, the strategic paper of which hints at NATO being a tool of freedom suppression, is able and willing to promote democratic reforms? How sure one can be that the leadership of such a party understands properly what democratic reforms stand for?

The era of political technologies

If the change of government in Moldova does not seem to fit well into the Russian model, then what stays behind it? It materialized the president Voronin’s appeal during the congress, emphasizing the need for fresh blood to lead the country. It looks like this step was pre-planned, and was purposefully designed to follow the communists’ congress. There is no consensus around the reasons why the ruling PCRM did this, even though the majority of political leaders and observers in Moldova agreed that it carried a pre-electoral weight. The way it was done resembles an attempt to sell the unhappy customer the same product, just in a different wrapping.

Such an unsubstantial maneuver would unlikely fool the domestic audience critical of PCRM governance. Following this rationale the conclusion comes that the target audience of this virtual politics is the West. President Voronin has learned that the West’s opinion about his alleged reforms matters a lot to both his supporters and opponents. The Western assessment of the 2009 elections could be crucial when trying to prove to the domestic audience the legitimacy of his party claimed performance in elections. This is an especially important detail, given the last year caution that PCRM received from Western elections monitoring missions for serious misuse of administrative resources, obstructing equal access to mainstream media to their political opponents, and even harassed them and their supporters.

By appointing a new government the Communist Party is sending the message that it is serious about catching up and paying its debts on many obligations and promises given during its second term in power. The only question is whether US and EU will buy this. During the communist ruling Moldova has backslid in democratic reforms. In fact the current Moldovan leadership has a close resemblance in its rhetoric and even some policy implementation with the separatist leadership in Tiraspol. Interestingly enough, after the resignation of the Tarlev government, but before the candidature of the new prime-minister was made public, there were posts on Moldovan blogs claiming the Transnistrian elites were convinced that Zinaida Grecianii was to become the new head of government. The same bloggers insisted that Tiraspol leadership knew about the Tarlev government departure two months ahead. These facts may suggest that the connection between the Communist Party and the separatist leadership in Tiraspol could have taken new forms lately, along with president Voronin moving closer to Russia in recent months.

The 2005, reloaded

This did not seem to catch the Western attention yet. Such type of virtual politics (a term used by Andrew WIlson, a scholar from the University College London, to coin what is largely known in the post-Soviet space as political technologies), employed by Moldovan communist leadership may succeed in attracting some part of the necessary support in Washington and Brussels. The depth of misreading the Moldovan case has got another proof in a recent Foreign Policy article, a magazine published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Under the title “Will Democracy Make You Happy?” it mentions that Moldovans may be the least happy nation on the planet. The author seemed to be uncomfortable with the idea that the conventional wisdom claiming “the path to national bliss is paved with democracy” failed to work in Moldova. Finally it reaches a questionable conclusion while attempting to answer, among others, the question why “Moldovan despair persists despite the advent of democracy”?

Reading this article many Moldovans will feel uncomfortable with the idea that people in the United States misperceive the ongoing processes in Moldova as democratic advent. However Moldovans may also be guilty of wrong judgment – they overlook how easy is to mislead an insufficiently informed audience. It is exactly in this context, that the idea of Moldovan communists convincing once again the West to render them support during the 2009 elections does not look impossible at all.

5 Responses to “The Rise of Virtual Politics in Moldova”

  1. vitalie Says:

    dumitru, mi se par cam fortate speculatiile cu succesorii si succesiunea in moldova… e o analogie grosiera care tine cont de aparente, dar cam uita de fondul problemei..
    – sa nu uitam ca in Rusia lui Putin, formatiunea pro-prezidentiala a obtinut o majoritate zdrobitoare la alegerile parlamentare, apoi, ca aceasta formatiune se bucura de majoritatea absoluta a optiunilor de vot
    - in moldova, sondajele ipp si imas arata ca PCRM este departe de a detine o majoritate macar confortabila, ca optiunile de vot ale alegatorilor sunt in permanenta schimbare, ca exista cateva blocuri mari de optiuni politice distincte (Pcrm, AMn, apoi vin din sapte formatiuni ca PL, PLDM si altele), dintre care nici unul nu detine o superioritate absoluta. so, scenariul succesorului mi se pare fortuit… cel mult un presedinte de compromis, daca comunistii pierd alegerile, chiar se poate unul fara carnet de partid…

  2. Dumitru Minzarari Says:

    Виталий, согласен с твоей точкой зрения что обьяснение смены правительства “преемничеством” сомнительна – именно это я и аргументирую в статье выше. Но не согласен с сущностью твоей аргументации, в том смысле что она не подходящая для нашего случая. Ты представляешь факты, и те, которые в какой-то мере сомнительны. В России опросы публичного мнения стали еще одним инструментом манипуляции массами, об этом писалось в российской прессе, если не ошибаюсь Наталия Морарь тоже писала. Я думаю что даже если поддержка Путина так велика как ее показывают, то в любом случае это не является реальным, обьективным представлением его популярности – фактор медиатизации играет огромную роль в сегодняшней РФ. Когда принялось решение о назначении преемником Медведева, и ТВ каналы стали показывать его больше чем Путина, то его популярность согласно опросам обошла популярность Путина довольно быстро. А значит популярность Путина не совсем хороший инструмент анализа. В статье я также даю и другие различия между случаями России и Молдовы.

    Также я считаю что ПКРМ держится в районе 40%+ популярности, что вкупе с манипуляциями выборов (типа недавних в Гагаузии), может дать им, если они грамотно разыграют карту, и не встретят сильного прессинга из-за рубежа, минимум законодательное большинство. Ихсодя из этого и других примеров описанных в тексте статьи, я и пришел к ее выводам.

  3. alru Says:

    Interesant care e sansa ca Greceanii sa fie inaintata ca candidat oficial al PCRM la alegerile viitoare. Dupa parerea mea ea e o candidatura destul de probabila:
    - are o reputatie buna de tehnocrat, care ar putea atrage o parte din electoratul neutru.
    - ambitiile ei sint probabil mai mici ca cele ale lui Tarlev. Daca Voronin doreste sa dicteze politica din umbra, atunci Tarlev in calitate de sef al statului ar putea fi mai putin cooperant, in caz ca ar ajunge presedinte – ambitiile personale l-ar putea impinge spre detronarea lui Vorornin. Am citit mai demult un fragment din Printul lui Machiaveli – persoana cea mai probabil sa te tradeze e protejatul tau (Tarlev protejatul lui Voronin).
    - ar putea fi un eveniment istoric – prima femeie sef al statului moldovenesc – iar Voronin cel ce a promovat-o.
    - Greceanii probabil nu ar sta in calea intereselor si legaturilor economice pe care Voronin le-a stabilit.

    Cred ca Greceanii are un an ca sa demonstreze ca poate cistiga destula tractiune politica pentru a deveni presedinte.
    Sigur toate acestea sint doar speculatii, nu stiu care e sansa ca ele sa se indeplineasca.

  4. dil okullari Says:

    do you know any information about this subject in other languages?

  5. Dumitru Minzarari Says:

    can you be more specific? about virtual politics generally, or its state in Moldova? what do you mean by “other languages”? There is plenty of general literature in English.


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